each other, they usually negotiate under enormous uncertainty: prices of similar each other, they usually negotiate under enormous uncertainty: prices of similar patents vary widely from transaction to transaction and the terms of the transactions patents vary widely from transaction to transaction and the terms of the transactions (including prices) are often secret and confi dential. (including prices) are often secret and confi dential.
Ineffi cient and illiquid markets, such as the one for patents, generally create Ineffi cient and illiquid markets, such as the one for patents, generally create profi t opportunities for intermediaries. In this paper, we begin with an overview profi t opportunities for intermediaries. In this paper, we begin with an overview of the problems that arise in patent markets, and how traditional institutions like of the problems that arise in patent markets, and how traditional institutions like patent brokers, patent pools, and standard-setting organizations have sought patent brokers, patent pools, and standard-setting organizations have sought to address them. But during the last decade, a variety of novel patent intermeto address them. But during the last decade, a variety of novel patent intermediaries has emerged. We will discuss how several online platforms have started diaries has emerged. We will discuss how several online platforms have started services for buying and selling patents but have failed to gain meaningful traction. services for buying and selling patents but have failed to gain meaningful traction. However, new intermediaries that we call defensive patent aggregators and superHowever, new intermediaries that we call defensive patent aggregators and superaggregators have become quite infl uential and controversial in the technology aggregators have become quite infl uential and controversial in the technology industries they touch. In particular, the rising prominence of a new and powerful industries they touch. In particular, the rising prominence of a new and powerful patent aggregator called Intellectual Ventures has sparked heated debates about patent aggregator called Intellectual Ventures has sparked heated debates about the economic role played by intermediaries in the patent market and their effects the economic role played by intermediaries in the patent market and their effects on innovation. on innovation. One might expect that new intermediaries and competition between them One might expect that new intermediaries and competition between them could lead to increased market effi ciency. Sometimes, however, intermediaries are could lead to increased market effi ciency. Sometimes, however, intermediaries are able to exploit market ineffi ciencies without contributing much social value or, able to exploit market ineffi ciencies without contributing much social value or, worse, they might even exacerbate existing market failures. The goal of this paper is worse, they might even exacerbate existing market failures. The goal of this paper is to shed light on the role and effi ciency tradeoffs of these new patent intermediaries. to shed light on the role and effi ciency tradeoffs of these new patent intermediaries. In the conclusion, we offer a provisional assessment of how the new patent intermeIn the conclusion, we offer a provisional assessment of how the new patent intermediary institutions affect economic welfare. diary institutions affect economic welfare.
Patent Market Failures and Traditional Patent Intermediaries
Why is the market for patents so illiquid and ineffi cient? While the root causes Why is the market for patents so illiquid and ineffi cient? While the root causes are well-known to economists and are a subset of market failures that arise in many are well-known to economists and are a subset of market failures that arise in many markets for ideas, it is useful to summarize them briefl y here, highlighting the issues markets for ideas, it is useful to summarize them briefl y here, highlighting the issues most relevant for patent intermediaries. Gans and Stern (2010) offer a review of most relevant for patent intermediaries. Gans and Stern (2010) offer a review of market failures in the market for ideas, many of which apply to patents. market failures in the market for ideas, many of which apply to patents.
First, patents are much more diffi cult to value than most other goods. This First, patents are much more diffi cult to value than most other goods. This problem arises not simply because patents are intangible assets: after all, intangibles problem arises not simply because patents are intangible assets: after all, intangibles such as brand equity are routinely valued. What sets patents apart is that every patent such as brand equity are routinely valued. What sets patents apart is that every patent 1 Because our notion of a patent intermediary is an organization (fi rm or not-for-profi t entity) that directly facilitates the sale or licensing of patents from owners-creators to users, we will not discuss here the patent rating, valuation, and search services that aim to create liquidity indirectly by providing useful patent information. An example of such a service is ArticleOne Partners (http://www.articleonepartners .com/). In addition, we focus specifi cally on patent intermediaries as opposed to other forms of intellectual property and more general notions of markets for technology (Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella 2001) and for ideas (Gans and Stern 2010) . Thus, our study does not cover fi rms like InnoCentive and NineSigma, which connect companies with individuals or institutions that can create pre-patent solutions to science or technology problems.
is by defi nition unique: they lack "comparables," which are used in many markets is by defi nition unique: they lack "comparables," which are used in many markets to estimate a given asset's value. More importantly, patent value in many modern to estimate a given asset's value. More importantly, patent value in many modern technologies is subject to strong complementarities and portfolio effects (Gans technologies is subject to strong complementarities and portfolio effects (Gans and Stern 2010; Parchomovsky and Wagner 2005) . The issue of complementariand Stern 2010; Parchomovsky and Wagner 2005) . The issue of complementarities arises because in industries like semiconductors and smart phones, products ties arises because in industries like semiconductors and smart phones, products are covered by dozens or even hundreds of interdependent patents. As a result, are covered by dozens or even hundreds of interdependent patents. As a result, the value of the value of individual patents is heavily discounted. Potential buyers or licensees patents is heavily discounted. Potential buyers or licensees may not place much value on a given patent sold by itself unless it complements may not place much value on a given patent sold by itself unless it complements a portfolio that they already own. This greatly reduces the number of buyers and a portfolio that they already own. This greatly reduces the number of buyers and the potential for liquidity. Portfolio effects create asymmetries between large operthe potential for liquidity. Portfolio effects create asymmetries between large operating fi rms on one side and individual inventors and small companies on the other ating fi rms on one side and individual inventors and small companies on the other side ( Jaffe and Lerner 2004) . There is a lower probability for smaller inventors to side ( Jaffe and Lerner 2004) . There is a lower probability for smaller inventors to monetize their patents because they lack a large portfolio and because their owners monetize their patents because they lack a large portfolio and because their owners typically have limited fi nancial resources and legal expertise, which severely undertypically have limited fi nancial resources and legal expertise, which severely undermines their ability to bargain effectively. A well-known example (and the subject mines their ability to bargain effectively. A well-known example (and the subject of the 2008 movie of the 2008 movie Flash of Genius) is that of engineer Robert Kearns, who in 1964 ) is that of engineer Robert Kearns, who in 1964 applied for a patent for an intermittent windshield wiper system for automobiles. applied for a patent for an intermittent windshield wiper system for automobiles. Manufacturers refused Kearns's requests to sign licensing agreements and began Manufacturers refused Kearns's requests to sign licensing agreements and began producing cars featuring the wiper system in 1969. Kearns spent decades battling producing cars featuring the wiper system in 1969. Kearns spent decades battling in court for infringement. He eventually earned $30 million in settlements from in court for infringement. He eventually earned $30 million in settlements from Ford and Chrysler but, in the process, lost his job, divorced, and suffered multiple Ford and Chrysler but, in the process, lost his job, divorced, and suffered multiple nervous breakdowns (Schudel 2005) . nervous breakdowns (Schudel 2005) .
Second, both sides of the patent market face high search costs. For patent Second, both sides of the patent market face high search costs. For patent owners, it is prohibitively costly to fi nd all current users (actual infringers) and owners, it is prohibitively costly to fi nd all current users (actual infringers) and all all potential applications of their patents. For potential patent buyers or users, it applications of their patents. For potential patent buyers or users, it is very costly to fi nd all prior art and patents that "read on" (that is, that might is very costly to fi nd all prior art and patents that "read on" (that is, that might cover the technology within) their products, especially when these products are cover the technology within) their products, especially when these products are complex and rely on fast-changing technologies. Indeed, although patent offi ces complex and rely on fast-changing technologies. Indeed, although patent offi ces around the world as well as private databases provide comprehensive and searcharound the world as well as private databases provide comprehensive and searchable lists of all patents issued, patent applicants typically seek to disclose only the able lists of all patents issued, patent applicants typically seek to disclose only the minimum necessary to obtain the patent, and use language that is oftentimes broad minimum necessary to obtain the patent, and use language that is oftentimes broad and opaque. This makes it very diffi cult to fi gure out their relationship with other and opaque. This makes it very diffi cult to fi gure out their relationship with other patents and prior art, particularly with millions of patents in circulation. To illuspatents and prior art, particularly with millions of patents in circulation. To illustrate, consider Apple's "bounce-back" utility patent, which was highly publicized trate, consider Apple's "bounce-back" utility patent, which was highly publicized during the recent during the recent Apple vs. Samsung trial settled in August 2012 before a California trial settled in August 2012 before a California jury (Gallagher 2012) . This patent essentially covers a method for allowing users to jury (Gallagher 2012) . This patent essentially covers a method for allowing users to scroll beyond the edge of an image, webpage, or list and have it bounce back onto scroll beyond the edge of an image, webpage, or list and have it bounce back onto the screen. Despite the highly intuitive nature of this functionality, it is quite hard the screen. Despite the highly intuitive nature of this functionality, it is quite hard to identify its scope and the way it is meant to be implemented from the language to identify its scope and the way it is meant to be implemented from the language used in the actual patent. used in the actual patent. Third, patent transactions always happen in the shadow of litigation, which Third, patent transactions always happen in the shadow of litigation, which exacerbates valuation problems and creates large transaction costs. Litigation often exacerbates valuation problems and creates large transaction costs. Litigation often implies that patents are best viewed as "probabilistic property rights" or "lottery implies that patents are best viewed as "probabilistic property rights" or "lottery tickets" (Lemley and Shapiro 2005): few patents are litigated, but of those that tickets" (Lemley and Shapiro 2005): few patents are litigated, but of those that are, approximately half end up being invalidated. Given this risk, many patent are, approximately half end up being invalidated. Given this risk, many patent owners and users prefer to settle out of court for amounts that have more to do owners and users prefer to settle out of court for amounts that have more to do with their opportunity costs of going to trial and their attitude towards risk than with their opportunity costs of going to trial and their attitude towards risk than with the "true" economic value of their patents. Is the plaintiff a small company or with the "true" economic value of their patents. Is the plaintiff a small company or individual with limited resources who prefers to settle for a small amount rather individual with limited resources who prefers to settle for a small amount rather than face the possibility of years of litigation? What about a competitor who can than face the possibility of years of litigation? What about a competitor who can be countersued and brought to accept a cross-licensing agreement? Or what about be countersued and brought to accept a cross-licensing agreement? Or what about a "nonpracticing entity" against which injunctions that they cannot produce the a "nonpracticing entity" against which injunctions that they cannot produce the product will not work-because the entity doesn't produce in the fi rst place. product will not work-because the entity doesn't produce in the fi rst place. Furthermore, some courts have a reputation for bias in favor of small players and Furthermore, some courts have a reputation for bias in favor of small players and against large companies, which makes them attractive patent litigation forums for against large companies, which makes them attractive patent litigation forums for small players and nonpracticing entities. For example, the Eastern District of Texas small players and nonpracticing entities. For example, the Eastern District of Texas received 25 percent of all US patent infringement cases during 2011 and found in received 25 percent of all US patent infringement cases during 2011 and found in favor of patent owners almost 75 percent of the time (Decker 2012) . The prospect favor of patent owners almost 75 percent of the time (Decker 2012) . The prospect of choosing a favorable court setting increases the amount of (ineffi cient) litigation. of choosing a favorable court setting increases the amount of (ineffi cient) litigation.
The complexity that arises when valuation is intertwined with litigation has been The complexity that arises when valuation is intertwined with litigation has been heightened by the emergence of the US International Trade Commission (ITC) as a heightened by the emergence of the US International Trade Commission (ITC) as a new forum for patent battles. The ITC is an independent federal agency with powers new forum for patent battles. The ITC is an independent federal agency with powers to do investigations and fact-fi nding on international trade issues, including import to do investigations and fact-fi nding on international trade issues, including import subsidies, dumping cases, and also issues of whether an imported product infringes subsidies, dumping cases, and also issues of whether an imported product infringes on existing intellectual property. The ITC typically decides much faster than federal on existing intellectual property. The ITC typically decides much faster than federal courts: often 12-15 months vs. several years in federal courts (Analysis Group, n.d.; courts: often 12-15 months vs. several years in federal courts (Analysis Group, n.d.; Fisher 2006) . It also offers the possibility of relatively quick injunctive relief against Fisher 2006) . It also offers the possibility of relatively quick injunctive relief against defendants: it can require that the offending imports be halted, which can be even defendants: it can require that the offending imports be halted, which can be even more effective in extracting monetary settlements. Qualcomm, for example, was forced more effective in extracting monetary settlements. Qualcomm, for example, was forced to negotiate an $891 million settlement with Broadcom in 2009, after losing a case at to negotiate an $891 million settlement with Broadcom in 2009, after losing a case at the ITC and facing an import ban (Crothers 2009). Thus, the ITC has signifi cantly the ITC and facing an import ban (Crothers 2009). Thus, the ITC has signifi cantly increased the costs of exposure to potential patent infringement lawsuits for fi rms in increased the costs of exposure to potential patent infringement lawsuits for fi rms in traded goods industries such as semiconductors, smartphones, and computers. traded goods industries such as semiconductors, smartphones, and computers.
These patent market failures are most problematic for individual inventors or These patent market failures are most problematic for individual inventors or small companies, who represent the majority of patent owners. One study, compiling small companies, who represent the majority of patent owners. One study, compiling data from a variety of public sources, found that inventors and small businesses data from a variety of public sources, found that inventors and small businesses contribute 60 percent of all patents in the United States, but only extract 1 percent contribute 60 percent of all patents in the United States, but only extract 1 percent of total licensing revenues. The remaining 99 percent of licensing revenue goes to of total licensing revenues. The remaining 99 percent of licensing revenue goes to large companies (Hagiu, Yoffi e, and Wagonfeld 2011, exhibit 11) . Of course, it is large companies (Hagiu, Yoffi e, and Wagonfeld 2011, exhibit 11) . Of course, it is not shocking that large companies may tend to focus on higher-value patents, but not shocking that large companies may tend to focus on higher-value patents, but the disjunction is nonetheless striking. the disjunction is nonetheless striking.
One possible mechanism for small patent owners to address the problems of One possible mechanism for small patent owners to address the problems of getting paid for their ideas would be to incorporate them in start-ups and seek either getting paid for their ideas would be to incorporate them in start-ups and seek either to compete with incumbent companies or to cooperate with them by licensing or to compete with incumbent companies or to cooperate with them by licensing or being acquired (Gans, Hsu, and Stern 2002) . In this way, investors, particularly being acquired (Gans, Hsu, and Stern 2002) . In this way, investors, particularly venture capitalists, could mitigate some of these market failures. But many patents venture capitalists, could mitigate some of these market failures. But many patents are not worth incorporating in a start-up, especially if they are not part of broader are not worth incorporating in a start-up, especially if they are not part of broader portfolios. Furthermore, great inventors are not necessarily great entrepreneurs portfolios. Furthermore, great inventors are not necessarily great entrepreneurs (Wasserman 2012). In fact, it is arguably more effi cient for inventors to specialize in (Wasserman 2012). In fact, it is arguably more effi cient for inventors to specialize in invention rather than to pursue commercialization, a point argued by Lamoreaux invention rather than to pursue commercialization, a point argued by Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (2003) in the context of late nineteenth century United States and and Sokoloff (2003) in the context of late nineteenth century United States and probably equally valid today. probably equally valid today.
With so many diffi culties facing inventors trying to monetize their discoveries, With so many diffi culties facing inventors trying to monetize their discoveries, an obvious answer is to create intermediaries that facilitate the sale of patents to an obvious answer is to create intermediaries that facilitate the sale of patents to users (mainly operating companies), thereby maintaining appropriate incentives users (mainly operating companies), thereby maintaining appropriate incentives for innovation. In the next section, we discuss the three main traditional patent for innovation. In the next section, we discuss the three main traditional patent intermediaries studied in the existing economics literature: patent brokers/agents, intermediaries studied in the existing economics literature: patent brokers/agents, patent pools, and standard-setting organizations. These traditional patent intermepatent pools, and standard-setting organizations. These traditional patent intermediaries have been around for a long time, but each faces certain limitations which diaries have been around for a long time, but each faces certain limitations which prevent them from solving many of the patent market's problems. prevent them from solving many of the patent market's problems.
Three Traditional Patent Intermediaries
Patent brokers help patent owners sell or license their technologies in exchange Patent brokers help patent owners sell or license their technologies in exchange for a fee contingent on successful transfer. Their activity helps reduce search and for a fee contingent on successful transfer. Their activity helps reduce search and transaction costs by investing in specifi c knowledge and connections on both sides transaction costs by investing in specifi c knowledge and connections on both sides of the market. Brokers often facilitate not just the sale or licensing of patents, but of the market. Brokers often facilitate not just the sale or licensing of patents, but broader technology transfers, which include patents and know-how. They also offer broader technology transfers, which include patents and know-how. They also offer consulting services helping patent owners market and sell their assets. There are a consulting services helping patent owners market and sell their assets. There are a large number of patent brokers, which tend to be small companies with fewer than large number of patent brokers, which tend to be small companies with fewer than 10 employees. Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (2003) document the positive effect of brokers on the US market for patented technology between 1870 and 1920. These brokers were the US market for patented technology between 1870 and 1920. These brokers were typically patent agents or lawyers who matched inventors looking to sell new technolotypically patent agents or lawyers who matched inventors looking to sell new technologies with investors or buyers eager to commercialize them. At that time, however, there gies with investors or buyers eager to commercialize them. At that time, however, there were few products encompassing hundreds of patented technologies like today: thus, were few products encompassing hundreds of patented technologies like today: thus, the portfolio effects problem was less prevalent, and patents with fuzzy and overlapping the portfolio effects problem was less prevalent, and patents with fuzzy and overlapping boundaries were relatively rare. The job of modern patent brokers is much harder than boundaries were relatively rare. The job of modern patent brokers is much harder than those of a century ago. Unlike other markets for assets like stocks or real estate, the those of a century ago. Unlike other markets for assets like stocks or real estate, the existence of many brokers in the patent market does not create suffi cient liquidity on existence of many brokers in the patent market does not create suffi cient liquidity on its own. Indeed, patent brokers are small in scale and tend to focus on facilitating highits own. Indeed, patent brokers are small in scale and tend to focus on facilitating highend licensing transactions that carry large price tags. Their fees are above 10 percent of end licensing transactions that carry large price tags. Their fees are above 10 percent of the value of the transaction and sometimes reach 20 -30 percent (Young 2008), a level the value of the transaction and sometimes reach 20 -30 percent (Young 2008), a level high enough to suggest that ineffi ciencies prevail in the patent market. high enough to suggest that ineffi ciencies prevail in the patent market. Patent pools are formal or informal organizations in which for-profi t fi rms Patent pools are formal or informal organizations in which for-profi t fi rms come together to license patents to each other or to third parties (Lerner, come together to license patents to each other or to third parties (Lerner, Strojwas, and Tirole 2007; Shapiro 2001 Lerner 2011) . Patent pools emerged to solve the "multiple marginalization" problem-also known as "royalty-stacking"-which arises when marginalization" problem-also known as "royalty-stacking"-which arises when multiple parties hold market power in a chain of production. If all parties attempt multiple parties hold market power in a chain of production. If all parties attempt to exercise their market power to the fullest, the resulting prices will typically be to exercise their market power to the fullest, the resulting prices will typically be above the level that would be set by a single party with market power-and the above the level that would be set by a single party with market power-and the joint profi ts and social welfare will be lower than in the case of a single party with joint profi ts and social welfare will be lower than in the case of a single party with market power. market power.
While patent pools can create social value by reducing royalty stacking, it is While patent pools can create social value by reducing royalty stacking, it is not clear how well they address the traditional problems of patent markets. First, if not clear how well they address the traditional problems of patent markets. First, if patents included in a pool are substitutes rather than complements, the pool may patents included in a pool are substitutes rather than complements, the pool may turn out to have anticompetitive effects in the form of higher prices: the pool faciliturn out to have anticompetitive effects in the form of higher prices: the pool facilitates price collusion at the expense of price competition (Shapiro 2001; Lerner tates price collusion at the expense of price competition (Shapiro 2001; Lerner and Tirole 2004) . Second, patent pools can create barriers to entry and innovation, and Tirole 2004). Second, patent pools can create barriers to entry and innovation, favoring large companies with sizable patent portfolios who are members of the favoring large companies with sizable patent portfolios who are members of the patent pool and discriminating against small companies or individual inventors patent pool and discriminating against small companies or individual inventors who fi nd it hard to negotiate their way into the pool. Third, the applicability of who fi nd it hard to negotiate their way into the pool. Third, the applicability of patent pools is limited to a small number of markets, where the essential intelpatent pools is limited to a small number of markets, where the essential intellectual property to producing a specifi c product or service is more or less evenly lectual property to producing a specifi c product or service is more or less evenly distributed among several large, identifi able players. distributed among several large, identifi able players.
Similarly, standard-setting organizations have made it possible for particiSimilarly, standard-setting organizations have made it possible for participants in industries where there is an important need for interoperability between pants in industries where there is an important need for interoperability between many components to come together and voluntarily produce consensus technical many components to come together and voluntarily produce consensus technical standards. Standard-setting organizations create economic value by enabling coorstandards. Standard-setting organizations create economic value by enabling coordination on (Simcoe 2012) and certifi cation of (Chiao, Lerner, and Tirole 2007 ; dination on (Simcoe 2012) and certifi cation of (Chiao, Lerner, and Tirole 2007; Lerner and Tirole 2006) technical standards. When these organizations endorse Lerner and Tirole 2006) technical standards. When these organizations endorse a specifi c technological standard, participants in the relevant industries typically a specifi c technological standard, participants in the relevant industries typically adopt that standard and agree to cross-license or to pay the required royalties to the adopt that standard and agree to cross-license or to pay the required royalties to the standard owner(s). The technological standard usually consists of many patents, standard owner(s). The technological standard usually consists of many patents, owned by a patent pool, or on rare occasions by one company or institution. The owned by a patent pool, or on rare occasions by one company or institution. The process of choosing and certifying standards, however, is often subject to confl icts of process of choosing and certifying standards, however, is often subject to confl icts of interest due to interference by large producers (Schmalensee 2009). Furthermore, interest due to interference by large producers (Schmalensee 2009). Furthermore, the scope of standard-setting organizations is limited to a small number of industhe scope of standard-setting organizations is limited to a small number of industries and technologies relative to the size of the broad patent market. tries and technologies relative to the size of the broad patent market.
Thus, while brokers, patent pools, and standard-setting organizations have a Thus, while brokers, patent pools, and standard-setting organizations have a role in bridging some of the gaps in the patent market, their effects are limited, role in bridging some of the gaps in the patent market, their effects are limited, and they have not managed to help small inventors get paid for their ideas. and they have not managed to help small inventors get paid for their ideas. Indeed, small patent owners generally do not participate in pools or standardIndeed, small patent owners generally do not participate in pools or standardsetting organizations, and most small patent owners are not worth the time of setting organizations, and most small patent owners are not worth the time of professional brokers. professional brokers.
Exploiting Market Failures: Nonpracticing Entities
The general lack of depth in patent markets has created a particularly favorable The general lack of depth in patent markets has created a particularly favorable environment for the so-called "nonpracticing entities," which have become the most environment for the so-called "nonpracticing entities," which have become the most controversial patent intermediaries. In essence, nonpracticing entities act as arbitracontroversial patent intermediaries. In essence, nonpracticing entities act as arbitrageurs, fi rst acquiring patents, typically from individual inventors or small companies, geurs, fi rst acquiring patents, typically from individual inventors or small companies, and then seeking licensing revenues from operating companies through litigation and then seeking licensing revenues from operating companies through litigation or the threat of litigation. These entities do not innovate themselves, nor do they or the threat of litigation. These entities do not innovate themselves, nor do they produce output. In 2001, nonpracticing entities brought 144 lawsuits targeting over produce output. In 2001, nonpracticing entities brought 144 lawsuits targeting over 578 operating companies; by 2011, the numbers had increased to 1,211 lawsuits 578 operating companies; by 2011, the numbers had increased to 1,211 lawsuits targeting 5,031 operating companies respectively (according to PatentFreedom targeting 5,031 operating companies respectively (according to PatentFreedom research at https://www.patentfreedom.com/research-lot.html). research at https://www.patentfreedom.com/research-lot.html).
Two main factors account for the explosion in activity of nonpracticing entiTwo main factors account for the explosion in activity of nonpracticing entities. First, the Internet has greatly reduced transaction costs for inventors to fi nd ties. First, the Internet has greatly reduced transaction costs for inventors to fi nd intermediaries to whom they can sell their patents (Spulber 2011) . Although intermediaries to whom they can sell their patents (Spulber 2011) . Although nonpracticing entities appeared in the second half of the 1990s, the way they found nonpracticing entities appeared in the second half of the 1990s, the way they found undervalued intellectual property assets at that time was largely serendipitous-for undervalued intellectual property assets at that time was largely serendipitous-for example, through personal connections to inventors or sales of distressed assets example, through personal connections to inventors or sales of distressed assets containing obscure patents. Today, with a quick Internet search, any inventor can containing obscure patents. Today, with a quick Internet search, any inventor can locate nonpracticing entities directly or contact brokers who can help one do so locate nonpracticing entities directly or contact brokers who can help one do so (Lohr 2009 ). (Lohr 2009 ).
Second, the value and prominence of patents have increased along with the Second, the value and prominence of patents have increased along with the revenues and profi ts associated with intellectual-property-intensive businesses. This revenues and profi ts associated with intellectual-property-intensive businesses. This growth was fueled in large part by the explosion of the information and commugrowth was fueled in large part by the explosion of the information and communication technology sectors in areas like software, semiconductors, and mobile nication technology sectors in areas like software, semiconductors, and mobile communications. Not coincidentally, most of the activity of the nonpracticing enticommunications. Not coincidentally, most of the activity of the nonpracticing entities is concentrated in those sectors. These industries produce complex products and ties is concentrated in those sectors. These industries produce complex products and services, which involve many interrelated processes and components. For example, services, which involve many interrelated processes and components. For example, manufacturing an integrated circuit requires hundreds of steps, with literally billions manufacturing an integrated circuit requires hundreds of steps, with literally billions of transistors and thousands of complex algorithms. Consequently, the potential for of transistors and thousands of complex algorithms. Consequently, the potential for newly issued patents to have "fuzzy boundaries" (in the sense of Besen and Meurer newly issued patents to have "fuzzy boundaries" (in the sense of Besen and Meurer 2008) and to overlap with prior art is very high in these sectors. Furthermore, no 2008) and to overlap with prior art is very high in these sectors. Furthermore, no fi rm-even the industry's largest ones-has more than 30 percent of the patents that fi rm-even the industry's largest ones-has more than 30 percent of the patents that cover semiconductor design and manufacturing. This fragmented ownership of the cover semiconductor design and manufacturing. This fragmented ownership of the relevant intellectual property exacerbates the uncertainty regarding the merits of relevant intellectual property exacerbates the uncertainty regarding the merits of the many patents involved. the many patents involved.
Contrast this situation with the pharmaceutical industry, where patents also Contrast this situation with the pharmaceutical industry, where patents also play a crucial role, but the boundaries of intellectual property are much more play a crucial role, but the boundaries of intellectual property are much more clearly defi ned. Patent claims on new molecules are easily distinguishable from clearly defi ned. Patent claims on new molecules are easily distinguishable from other patented molecules. Not surprisingly then, nonpracticing entities and other other patented molecules. Not surprisingly then, nonpracticing entities and other patent merchants have been largely absent from the pharmaceutical sector. In patent merchants have been largely absent from the pharmaceutical sector. In contrast, different patents on smartphone user interfaces oftentimes contain closely contrast, different patents on smartphone user interfaces oftentimes contain closely related claims. For example, the difference between a horizontal and a vertical related claims. For example, the difference between a horizontal and a vertical swiping mechanism for unlocking a touchscreen smartphone leaves lots of room swiping mechanism for unlocking a touchscreen smartphone leaves lots of room for interpretation. How a jury might construe these claims create big opportunities for interpretation. How a jury might construe these claims create big opportunities for nonpracticing entities. for nonpracticing entities.
The arbitrage opportunities available to nonpracticing entities are sizable. As The arbitrage opportunities available to nonpracticing entities are sizable. As of 2010, the median price paid by nonpracticing entities for a patent was approxiof 2010, the median price paid by nonpracticing entities for a patent was approximately $100,000 and the mean was $400,000 (according to PatentFreedom website, mately $100,000 and the mean was $400,000 (according to PatentFreedom website, accessed December 2010). On the other side of the market, most patent settlements accessed December 2010). On the other side of the market, most patent settlements range between $50,000 and a few million dollars (Sharma and Clark 2008) . In a few range between $50,000 and a few million dollars (Sharma and Clark 2008) . In a few notable cases, however, nonpracticing entities have managed to extract hundreds of notable cases, however, nonpracticing entities have managed to extract hundreds of millions of dollars. The best-known example is a 2006 settlement in which Research millions of dollars. The best-known example is a 2006 settlement in which Research in Motion (maker of the Blackberry smartphones) agreed to pay $612.5 million to in Motion (maker of the Blackberry smartphones) agreed to pay $612.5 million to NTP, a Virginia-based nonpracticing entity, which had sued Research in Motion for NTP, a Virginia-based nonpracticing entity, which had sued Research in Motion for infringing on eight wireless email patents (Riordan 2004 ). While precise data on infringing on eight wireless email patents (Riordan 2004 ). While precise data on the distributions of prices paid and settlements received by nonpracticing entities the distributions of prices paid and settlements received by nonpracticing entities is unavailable, it is useful to consider the following back-of-the-envelope calculais unavailable, it is useful to consider the following back-of-the-envelope calculation based on the numbers above. If 99/100 settlements are uniformly distributed tion based on the numbers above. If 99/100 settlements are uniformly distributed between $50,000 and $1 million and 1/100 settlements are for $100 million, then between $50,000 and $1 million and 1/100 settlements are for $100 million, then the net expected payoff for a risk-neutral nonpracticing entity for purchasing the net expected payoff for a risk-neutral nonpracticing entity for purchasing a patent is approximately $1.15 million. Even after litigation costs, this offers an a patent is approximately $1.15 million. Even after litigation costs, this offers an attractive arbitrage opportunity. attractive arbitrage opportunity.
Nonpracticing entities have attracted fi nancing from investors looking for Nonpracticing entities have attracted fi nancing from investors looking for novel diversifi cation opportunities with high returns. A number of hedge fund, novel diversifi cation opportunities with high returns. A number of hedge fund, venture capital, and private equity fi rms either invest in nonpracticing entities or venture capital, and private equity fi rms either invest in nonpracticing entities or approach small patent-holders directly, offering to fi nance lawsuits against operating approach small patent-holders directly, offering to fi nance lawsuits against operating companies in exchange for a cut of any resulting payments (for some examples, see companies in exchange for a cut of any resulting payments (for some examples, see Nonpracticing entities are sometimes pejoratively known as "patent trolls." Nonpracticing entities are sometimes pejoratively known as "patent trolls." The originator of the patent troll model is generally agreed to be the company The originator of the patent troll model is generally agreed to be the company TechSearch and its lawyer Raymond Niro. Beginning in the late 1990s, TechSearch TechSearch and its lawyer Raymond Niro. Beginning in the late 1990s, TechSearch originated the practice of buying up patents and suing companies for infringement originated the practice of buying up patents and suing companies for infringement to demand payments (Bario 2011). In 2001, Intel's in-house lawyer Peter Detkin to demand payments (Bario 2011). In 2001, Intel's in-house lawyer Peter Detkin referred to Niro as a "patent troll" and popularized the term. (Perhaps ironically, referred to Niro as a "patent troll" and popularized the term. (Perhaps ironically, Detkin went on to cofound Intellectual Ventures, the largest nonpracticing entity Detkin went on to cofound Intellectual Ventures, the largest nonpracticing entity today, which we discuss below.) The meaning of the term "patent troll" has evolved today, which we discuss below.) The meaning of the term "patent troll" has evolved over time, and there is no commonly agreed-on defi nition. However, trolls are over time, and there is no commonly agreed-on defi nition. However, trolls are generally viewed as combining the following characteristics: 1) they acquire intelgenerally viewed as combining the following characteristics: 1) they acquire intellectual property assets, like patents, solely for the purpose of extracting payments lectual property assets, like patents, solely for the purpose of extracting payments from alleged infringers; 2) they do not do research or develop any technology or from alleged infringers; 2) they do not do research or develop any technology or products related to their patents; and 3) they behave opportunistically by waiting products related to their patents; and 3) they behave opportunistically by waiting until industry participants have made irreversible investments before asserting their until industry participants have made irreversible investments before asserting their claims ( In itself, buying and reselling patents solely for price arbitrage is not necessarily In itself, buying and reselling patents solely for price arbitrage is not necessarily a harmful practice. One could even argue that it increases market effi ciency by a harmful practice. One could even argue that it increases market effi ciency by creating liquidity and a way for small patent owners to get paid, similar to the funccreating liquidity and a way for small patent owners to get paid, similar to the function performed by dealers and market-makers in fi nancial markets (McDonough tion performed by dealers and market-makers in fi nancial markets (McDonough 2006; Schmalensee 2009; Spulber 2011) . The main reason that nonpracticing 2006; Schmalensee 2009; Spulber 2011). The main reason that nonpracticing entities can instead create economic harm is that they seek to extract disproporentities can instead create economic harm is that they seek to extract disproportionate payments through two practices. First, they typically engage in "nuisance tionate payments through two practices. First, they typically engage in "nuisance value" litigation: they sue many companies simultaneously for moderate amounts value" litigation: they sue many companies simultaneously for moderate amounts so that targets are more likely to settle instead of risking a costly and uncertain so that targets are more likely to settle instead of risking a costly and uncertain trial. Second, they attempt to hold up (or "ambush") practicing companies by trial. Second, they attempt to hold up (or "ambush") practicing companies by bringing the lawsuits at the most vulnerable times for the targets, like just before bringing the lawsuits at the most vulnerable times for the targets, like just before the release of a new product, when the target can ill afford a risky trial involving its the release of a new product, when the target can ill afford a risky trial involving its new product shipments. Memory chip companies, for example, accused Rambus of new product shipments. Memory chip companies, for example, accused Rambus of ambushing the industry with litigation just after a new industry standard had been ambushing the industry with litigation just after a new industry standard had been set (Schmalensee 2009). set (Schmalensee 2009).
3 3 These two practices exacerbate patent market ineffi cienThese two practices exacerbate patent market ineffi ciencies. The net effect is to create perverse incentives for some small patent owners cies. The net effect is to create perverse incentives for some small patent owners to seek out nonpracticing entities to acquire and enforce patents of questionable to seek out nonpracticing entities to acquire and enforce patents of questionable merit. In addition, the expansion of such lawsuits may well produce a defensive merit. In addition, the expansion of such lawsuits may well produce a defensive backlash by large operating companies against all small patent owners, even the backlash by large operating companies against all small patent owners, even the ones that might have a legitimate and valuable claim. ones that might have a legitimate and valuable claim.
Two-sided Patent Platforms: A Failed Solution
In parallel with the increased activity of nonpracticing entities during the In parallel with the increased activity of nonpracticing entities during the 2000s, a number of companies built two-sided platforms in an attempt to create 2000s, a number of companies built two-sided platforms in an attempt to create more effi cient ways to bring buyers and sellers of patents together. The goal of more effi cient ways to bring buyers and sellers of patents together. The goal of two-sided patent platforms was to facilitate patent transactions without taking title two-sided patent platforms was to facilitate patent transactions without taking title or ownership of the patents involved. Two main categories of such platforms have or ownership of the patents involved. Two main categories of such platforms have been attempted: online marketplaces and live auctions. been attempted: online marketplaces and live auctions.
Online patent marketplaces appeared as early as 1998, but replicating in the Online patent marketplaces appeared as early as 1998, but replicating in the market for patents what eBay has done for collectibles has proven diffi cult. Some of market for patents what eBay has done for collectibles has proven diffi cult. Some of the online portals dedicated to facilitating patent search and transactions have been the online portals dedicated to facilitating patent search and transactions have been shut down or renamed and redirected towards other services. shut down or renamed and redirected towards other services. Both websites contain thousands of listings for both sides of the market. Sellers post detailed information about the patents ings for both sides of the market. Sellers post detailed information about the patents they want to sell, along with any special conditions (for example, perhaps a license they want to sell, along with any special conditions (for example, perhaps a license must be granted back to the seller) and without revealing their identity. Buyers can must be granted back to the seller) and without revealing their identity. Buyers can fi nd information about patents that are in the market for sale, search by keywords fi nd information about patents that are in the market for sale, search by keywords and patent classes, and post descriptions of specifi c intellectual property assets in and patent classes, and post descriptions of specifi c intellectual property assets in which they have an interest, also without revealing their identity. Both Tynax and which they have an interest, also without revealing their identity. Both Tynax and Yet2 work with Fortune 500 companies, and for both, keeping the identities of Yet2 work with Fortune 500 companies, and for both, keeping the identities of buyers and sellers confi dential is a key part of their value proposition. Furthermore, buyers and sellers confi dential is a key part of their value proposition. Furthermore, they employ various mechanisms like screening through upfront fees and disclosure they employ various mechanisms like screening through upfront fees and disclosure requirements to mitigate adverse selection in which only weak patents are offered requirements to mitigate adverse selection in which only weak patents are offered for sale (Dushnitsky and Klueter 2011)-a potentially serious concern for online for sale (Dushnitsky and Klueter 2011)-a potentially serious concern for online trading platforms. Indeed, in the absence of fees, the ratio of low-quality to hightrading platforms. Indeed, in the absence of fees, the ratio of low-quality to highquality products is very high on any online marketplace (for example, Craigslist). quality products is very high on any online marketplace (for example, Craigslist). This clutter signifi cantly raises search costs for buyers, which in turn disincentivizes This clutter signifi cantly raises search costs for buyers, which in turn disincentivizes high-quality product suppliers from participating. The problem is even worse for high-quality product suppliers from participating. The problem is even worse for patents, because search costs are already very high. patents, because search costs are already very high. Despite the extensive listings on Yet2 and Tynax's online portals, no transacDespite the extensive listings on Yet2 and Tynax's online portals, no transactions are completed online. Instead, once a buyer or a seller expresses clear and tions are completed online. Instead, once a buyer or a seller expresses clear and credible interest in a posting, Tynax or Yet2 manages and facilitates the buyer-seller credible interest in a posting, Tynax or Yet2 manages and facilitates the buyer-seller interaction offl ine through one of its dealmakers-who is an actual person. The interaction offl ine through one of its dealmakers-who is an actual person. The majority of revenues come from commissions on completed transactions: $100,000 majority of revenues come from commissions on completed transactions: $100,000 to $10 million for Tynax or 15 percent of licensing fees for Yet2. Thus, both Tynax to $10 million for Tynax or 15 percent of licensing fees for Yet2. Thus, both Tynax and Yet2 remain essentially patent and technology brokerage fi rms. and Yet2 remain essentially patent and technology brokerage fi rms.
At fi rst glance, auctions might have seemed like a useful mechanism for At fi rst glance, auctions might have seemed like a useful mechanism for eliciting market valuations for patents. The fact that Chicago-based Ocean Tomo eliciting market valuations for patents. The fact that Chicago-based Ocean Tomo managed to organize ten live intellectual property auctions between April 2006 managed to organize ten live intellectual property auctions between April 2006 and June 2009 generated signifi cant buzz and optimism regarding the potential for and June 2009 generated signifi cant buzz and optimism regarding the potential for bringing liquidity to the patent market via platforms. These auctions functioned bringing liquidity to the patent market via platforms. These auctions functioned like other live auctions-for example, like art at Sotheby's and Christie's-with like other live auctions-for example, like art at Sotheby's and Christie's-with an auctioneer taking bids for each lot, which could be a single patent, copyright, an auctioneer taking bids for each lot, which could be a single patent, copyright, trademark, or domain name right, or a bundle of such assets. The lots were sold trademark, or domain name right, or a bundle of such assets. The lots were sold to the highest bidder on condition that the highest bid exceeded the seller's to the highest bidder on condition that the highest bid exceeded the seller's reserve price. reserve price.
But the auctions struggled to gain traction. The total value of transactions But the auctions struggled to gain traction. The total value of transactions through Ocean Tomo's ten intellectual property auctions was only $114.6 million through Ocean Tomo's ten intellectual property auctions was only $114.6 million (Jarosz, Heider, Bazelon, Bieri, and Hess 2010, p. 17 ). This total is relatively small, (Jarosz, Heider, Bazelon, Bieri, and Hess 2010, p. 17 ). This total is relatively small, especially when compared to, say, the billions of dollars spent on patent portfolios by especially when compared to, say, the billions of dollars spent on patent portfolios by intellectual property for the music and entertainment industry. Other online platforms for matching patent sellers or licensors with buyers or licensees that have disappeared include Open-IP.org, TechEx, PricewaterhouseCoopers' IPEX, and Ocean Tomo's "The Dean's List."
Google in 2011-12 alone. The average sales-to-listings ratio over all ten Ocean Tomo Google in 2011-12 alone. The average sales-to-listings ratio over all ten Ocean Tomo auctions was reportedly 38 percent, and the spring 2009 auction only sold six out of auctions was reportedly 38 percent, and the spring 2009 auction only sold six out of 85 lots listed ( 85 lots listed (Inside IP 2012) . Part of the reason for the lack of activity in spring 2009 2012). Part of the reason for the lack of activity in spring 2009 was the fi nancial crisis, but all auctions had been characterized by low participawas the fi nancial crisis, but all auctions had been characterized by low participation and little bidding (Jarosz, Heider, Bazelon, Bieri, and Hess 2010, p. 20 -22) . In tion and little bidding (Jarosz, Heider, Bazelon, Bieri, and Hess 2010, p. 20 -22) Thus, while the idea of creating two-sided platforms for matching and faciliThus, while the idea of creating two-sided platforms for matching and facilitating transactions between patent buyers and sellers is appealing in principle, so tating transactions between patent buyers and sellers is appealing in principle, so far none of these platforms has been able to gain signifi cant traction. None is close far none of these platforms has been able to gain signifi cant traction. None is close to creating a sustainable eBay or Sotheby's for intellectual property. One might to creating a sustainable eBay or Sotheby's for intellectual property. One might argue that Tynax and Yet2.com are creating the economic equivalent of Craigslist argue that Tynax and Yet2.com are creating the economic equivalent of Craigslist for patents, but little more. Why is it so hard to establish two-sided platforms for for patents, but little more. Why is it so hard to establish two-sided platforms for patent transactions? patent transactions?
First, two-sided platforms that attempt to bring together buyers and sellers First, two-sided platforms that attempt to bring together buyers and sellers without ever taking possession of the goods being exchanged face a diffi cult without ever taking possession of the goods being exchanged face a diffi cult chicken-and-egg problem. Unlike market-makers who buy and resell, two-sided chicken-and-egg problem. Unlike market-makers who buy and resell, two-sided platforms have to attract a critical mass of both buyers and sellers. Some online platforms have to attract a critical mass of both buyers and sellers. Some online platforms managed to attract many listings, but (as pointed out above) they do not platforms managed to attract many listings, but (as pointed out above) they do not facilitate many actual transactions. Ocean Tomo's auctions never achieved suffi cient facilitate many actual transactions. Ocean Tomo's auctions never achieved suffi cient scale to convince buyers and sellers that they would become an important venue for scale to convince buyers and sellers that they would become an important venue for trading patents. Owners of valuable patents did not trading patents. Owners of valuable patents did not expect these platforms to offer these platforms to offer attractive monetization opportunities for their assets compared to other options attractive monetization opportunities for their assets compared to other options like licensing directly, selling to nonprofi t entities and splitting the proceeds from like licensing directly, selling to nonprofi t entities and splitting the proceeds from litigation, or raising venture capital funding and incorporating. In turn, the lack litigation, or raising venture capital funding and incorporating. In turn, the lack of valuable patents meant that few large operating companies would participate of valuable patents meant that few large operating companies would participate actively, which confi rmed the initial negative expectation of sellers-owners. A broad actively, which confi rmed the initial negative expectation of sellers-owners. A broad market was never created; instead a handful of nonprofi t entities were very active as market was never created; instead a handful of nonprofi t entities were very active as buyers in Ocean Tomo's auctions (Malek 2009). buyers in Ocean Tomo's auctions (Malek 2009).
Second, while online intellectual property platforms like Tynax and Yet2.com Second, while online intellectual property platforms like Tynax and Yet2.com have generated some search cost reductions through their thousands of listings, have generated some search cost reductions through their thousands of listings, they have been unable to create signifi cant reductions in transaction costs. The they have been unable to create signifi cant reductions in transaction costs. The sensitivity of intellectual property information and the need for "close-touch" and sensitivity of intellectual property information and the need for "close-touch" and often in-person due diligence make potential buyers and sellers reluctant to reveal often in-person due diligence make potential buyers and sellers reluctant to reveal enough details for completing a patent transactions online. Of course, this is why enough details for completing a patent transactions online. Of course, this is why Tynax and Yet2.com still function as offl ine brokers for the actual transactions. But if Tynax and Yet2.com still function as offl ine brokers for the actual transactions. But if personal dealmakers have to be directly involved in each transaction, their business personal dealmakers have to be directly involved in each transaction, their business model cannot easily scale up at low marginal cost. Moreover, the fi nal transaction model cannot easily scale up at low marginal cost. Moreover, the fi nal transaction prices and valuations are private information, which cannot be leveraged to create prices and valuations are private information, which cannot be leveraged to create greater transparency and liquidity in the patent market. greater transparency and liquidity in the patent market.
Will two-sided patent platforms remain limited in scope and scale? Even if they Will two-sided patent platforms remain limited in scope and scale? Even if they overcome the chicken-and-egg hurdle of how to attract the high-quality and highovercome the chicken-and-egg hurdle of how to attract the high-quality and highvalue patents, patent platforms seem unlikely to solve the liquidity problems that value patents, patent platforms seem unlikely to solve the liquidity problems that plague the market for patents. Indeed, given the heterogeneity and strategic sensiplague the market for patents. Indeed, given the heterogeneity and strategic sensitivity of patent transactions, it is hard to see how one could create the equivalent tivity of patent transactions, it is hard to see how one could create the equivalent of an eBay for patents. Furthermore, the strong complementarities and portfolio of an eBay for patents. Furthermore, the strong complementarities and portfolio effects across modern patents imply that two-sided platforms are at an inherent effects across modern patents imply that two-sided platforms are at an inherent disadvantage relative to other types of patent intermediaries who take ownership disadvantage relative to other types of patent intermediaries who take ownership of patents and are able to exploit those complementarities directly. By defi nition, of patents and are able to exploit those complementarities directly. By defi nition, two-sided platforms cannot do so. That diagnosis does not rule out the emertwo-sided platforms cannot do so. That diagnosis does not rule out the emergence (or growth) of platforms specializing in reducing search costs-similar to gence (or growth) of platforms specializing in reducing search costs-similar to Tynax and Yet2.com. There is value in being able to browse through thousands of Tynax and Yet2.com. There is value in being able to browse through thousands of patents, bundles of patents, and technologies wanted or for sale in one place and patents, bundles of patents, and technologies wanted or for sale in one place and in a unifi ed format. The offi cial Patent Offi ce listings-patents granted or under in a unifi ed format. The offi cial Patent Offi ce listings-patents granted or under review and searchable patent abstracts-leave signifi cant scope for quasi-brokers to review and searchable patent abstracts-leave signifi cant scope for quasi-brokers to further reduce search costs with better listings and search functionality. As pointed further reduce search costs with better listings and search functionality. As pointed out above, many offi cial patent abstracts are written in such a way as to discourage out above, many offi cial patent abstracts are written in such a way as to discourage workarounds and to make the broadest possible claims, which often makes it hard workarounds and to make the broadest possible claims, which often makes it hard to identify potential applications. In this context, fi rms such as Yet2 create their to identify potential applications. In this context, fi rms such as Yet2 create their own abstracts written in clear language in order to help potential buyers assess the own abstracts written in clear language in order to help potential buyers assess the potential benefi ts of the patented technology they are investigating. potential benefi ts of the patented technology they are investigating.
Defensive Aggregators and Super-aggregators
The rise of nonpracticing entities combined with the failure of patent platforms The rise of nonpracticing entities combined with the failure of patent platforms to bring transparency and liquidity to the patent market (which might have reduced to bring transparency and liquidity to the patent market (which might have reduced the arbitrage opportunities for nonpracticing entities) have posed a growing threat the arbitrage opportunities for nonpracticing entities) have posed a growing threat to operating companies. In response, two new novel patent intermediaries have to operating companies. In response, two new novel patent intermediaries have emerged, which we call defensive aggregators and super-aggregators. emerged, which we call defensive aggregators and super-aggregators.
Defensive Aggregators
There are currently two prominent defensive aggregators: RPX (a for-profi t fi rm, There are currently two prominent defensive aggregators: RPX (a for-profi t fi rm, publicly traded since May 2011) and Allied Security Trust (a not-for-profi t). In essence, publicly traded since May 2011) and Allied Security Trust (a not-for-profi t). In essence, defensive aggregators offer an incomplete insurance policy against patent troll risk defensive aggregators offer an incomplete insurance policy against patent troll risk to large operating companies. Samsung, Sony, and Verizon pay RPX annual subscription fees ranging from $65,000 to $6.9 million, depending on operating income (as explained at RPX's website: to $6.9 million, depending on operating income (as explained at RPX's website: http://www.rpxcorp.com/index.cfm?pageid=85, accessed May 2012). In exchange, http://www.rpxcorp.com/index.cfm?pageid=85, accessed May 2012). In exchange, RPX identifi es patents that RPX identifi es patents that might threaten subscribers, acquires those patents (or threaten subscribers, acquires those patents (or the right to grant sublicenses) in the open market, and provides all of its subscribers the right to grant sublicenses) in the open market, and provides all of its subscribers with licenses to those patents. The patents owned by RPX are also made available for with licenses to those patents. The patents owned by RPX are also made available for use in counterlawsuits against nonmembers who initiate litigation against members. use in counterlawsuits against nonmembers who initiate litigation against members.
Unlike a traditional insurance policy, RPX faces no liability if a subscriber is sued or Unlike a traditional insurance policy, RPX faces no liability if a subscriber is sued or loses a patent case. loses a patent case.
Allied Security Trust, known as AST, offers two main variations on the RPX Allied Security Trust, known as AST, offers two main variations on the RPX model. First, RPX decides unilaterally (sometimes in consultation with members) model. First, RPX decides unilaterally (sometimes in consultation with members) which patents to buy and uses its own capital to do so, while AST identifi es patents which patents to buy and uses its own capital to do so, while AST identifi es patents or portfolios of patents and then solicits acquisition bids from its subscribers, who or portfolios of patents and then solicits acquisition bids from its subscribers, who are also its governing members. Within AST, the bids and the identity of the bidders are also its governing members. Within AST, the bids and the identity of the bidders are kept secret from one another, and each member is required to have suffi cient are kept secret from one another, and each member is required to have suffi cient funds in an escrow account in order to support every bid it makes (as explained funds in an escrow account in order to support every bid it makes (as explained at the Allied Security Trust website at http://www.alliedsecuritytrust.com/Services at the Allied Security Trust website at http://www.alliedsecuritytrust.com/Services /AcquisitionModel.aspx). If the sum of the bids for a particular set of patents is /AcquisitionModel.aspx). If the sum of the bids for a particular set of patents is suffi cient to close the transaction, then only the members who bid for that particsuffi cient to close the transaction, then only the members who bid for that particular acquisition receive a license to the relevant intellectual property (as explained ular acquisition receive a license to the relevant intellectual property (as explained at http://www.alliedsecuritytrust.com/Services/LicensingModel.aspx). In the case at http://www.alliedsecuritytrust.com/Services/LicensingModel.aspx). In the case of RPX, all members receive a license to all patents acquired by RPX. AST's licenses of RPX, all members receive a license to all patents acquired by RPX. AST's licenses are perpetual from the outset, unlike RPX which introduces vesting periods in its are perpetual from the outset, unlike RPX which introduces vesting periods in its licenses. Members who do not bid in the initial acquisition can still subsequently licenses. Members who do not bid in the initial acquisition can still subsequently purchase a license to the patents involved, at a price equal to the highest bid. purchase a license to the patents involved, at a price equal to the highest bid.
Second, after AST acquires a set of patents and licenses its bidding members, it Second, after AST acquires a set of patents and licenses its bidding members, it looks to sell those patents. It starts by offering each of the original bidders, starting looks to sell those patents. It starts by offering each of the original bidders, starting with the highest one, the opportunity to buy out the entire portfolio by reimbursing with the highest one, the opportunity to buy out the entire portfolio by reimbursing the other bidders and AST's related expenses. If none of the bidders is interested, the other bidders and AST's related expenses. If none of the bidders is interested, AST places the portfolio for sale with a broker (a divestiture process explained at AST places the portfolio for sale with a broker (a divestiture process explained at http://www.alliedsecuritytrust.com/Services/DivestitureProcess.aspx). In contrast, http://www.alliedsecuritytrust.com/Services/DivestitureProcess.aspx). In contrast, RPX only sells patents occasionally, when it deems that they are no longer useful to RPX only sells patents occasionally, when it deems that they are no longer useful to its subscribers. its subscribers.
For economists, defensive aggregators raise some interesting issues about For economists, defensive aggregators raise some interesting issues about contracting. First, the value of RPX to its subscribers seems diffi cult to verify. contracting. First, the value of RPX to its subscribers seems diffi cult to verify. Unlike traditional insurers who pay customers when "accidents" happen, defensive Unlike traditional insurers who pay customers when "accidents" happen, defensive aggregators get paid to reduce the probability of "accidents"-in this case, lawsuits aggregators get paid to reduce the probability of "accidents"-in this case, lawsuits from nonproducing entities. But how can members know that RPX is effectively from nonproducing entities. But how can members know that RPX is effectively reducing litigation risk on their behalf? Presumably, part of the answer lies is reducing litigation risk on their behalf? Presumably, part of the answer lies is the number of relevant patents that RPX buys. But perhaps more importantly, the number of relevant patents that RPX buys. But perhaps more importantly, subscribers view RPX as offering a more effi cient buying service for patents they subscribers view RPX as offering a more effi cient buying service for patents they have have already identifi ed as threatening. When patents are critical to their business, identifi ed as threatening. When patents are critical to their business, operating companies will often buy them on their own. The issue for many fi rms is operating companies will often buy them on their own. The issue for many fi rms is what to do about marginally relevant patents: the expected value of the potential what to do about marginally relevant patents: the expected value of the potential damage may not be suffi cient to justify the cost of buying the patent unilaterally, damage may not be suffi cient to justify the cost of buying the patent unilaterally, but it may be worth the membership fee paid to RPX, who in turn can aggregate but it may be worth the membership fee paid to RPX, who in turn can aggregate payments across multiple subscribers. payments across multiple subscribers.
Second, defensive aggregators make an intriguing public commitment Second, defensive aggregators make an intriguing public commitment never to litigate in order to extract revenues (for example, see RPX's website http:// to litigate in order to extract revenues (for example, see RPX's website http:// rpxcorp.com/, accessed May 2012). This commitment helps differentiate them rpxcorp.com/, accessed May 2012). This commitment helps differentiate them from patent trolls and serves to reassure potential subscribers, but at the same time, from patent trolls and serves to reassure potential subscribers, but at the same time, it creates a signifi cant free-rider problem. When RPX buys a patent (say, for Nokia it creates a signifi cant free-rider problem. When RPX buys a patent (say, for Nokia in smartphones), and eliminates the threat from a troll, then nonsubscribers in in smartphones), and eliminates the threat from a troll, then nonsubscribers in the same industries (say, Motorola) equally benefi t, so they may be less likely to the same industries (say, Motorola) equally benefi t, so they may be less likely to pay RPX's subscription fees. One way in which RPX mitigates this problem is by pay RPX's subscription fees. One way in which RPX mitigates this problem is by adopting a "catch-and-release" approach: it acquires a patent, grants its subscribers adopting a "catch-and-release" approach: it acquires a patent, grants its subscribers a license, and then resells the patent on the open market (preferably to a nonpraca license, and then resells the patent on the open market (preferably to a nonpracticing entity), which means nonsubscribers remain exposed to litigation risk ticing entity), which means nonsubscribers remain exposed to litigation risk (Hansell 2009 ). Still, reselling the patents acquired reduces the value of subscribing (Hansell 2009 ). Still, reselling the patents acquired reduces the value of subscribing to RPX for to RPX for new members. This approach also complicates the decision for existing members. This approach also complicates the decision for existing members, who have to determine whether to renew their subscriptions. members, who have to determine whether to renew their subscriptions.
Third, the defensive aggregator business model faces an inherent limitation by Third, the defensive aggregator business model faces an inherent limitation by relying exclusively on subscription revenues. RPX has no shot at the huge payoffs relying exclusively on subscription revenues. RPX has no shot at the huge payoffs that can be achieved by nonpracticing entities (or a super-aggregator like Intelthat can be achieved by nonpracticing entities (or a super-aggregator like Intellectual Ventures, which we discuss below). In turn, this puts RPX at a disadvantage lectual Ventures, which we discuss below). In turn, this puts RPX at a disadvantage in acquiring patents. For example, nonpracticing entities can offer payments for in acquiring patents. For example, nonpracticing entities can offer payments for patents that are at least partially contingent on what might be received in a later patents that are at least partially contingent on what might be received in a later lawsuit-and therefore a much larger potential payoff to owners-whereas RPX lawsuit-and therefore a much larger potential payoff to owners-whereas RPX can only offer a fi xed payment. RPX may also face unreasonable prices from patent can only offer a fi xed payment. RPX may also face unreasonable prices from patent owners if the latter interpret an approach by RPX as a sign of interest from its owners if the latter interpret an approach by RPX as a sign of interest from its subscribers-who are, after all, large and potentially rich operating companies. subscribers-who are, after all, large and potentially rich operating companies. This outcome is related to the issue of "awareness-inducing information" in incomThis outcome is related to the issue of "awareness-inducing information" in incomplete contract settings studied formally in Tirole (2009) . RPX tries to mitigate this plete contract settings studied formally in Tirole (2009) . RPX tries to mitigate this problem by forming buying syndicates among its subscribers and then using shell problem by forming buying syndicates among its subscribers and then using shell companies to buy patents of interest to the syndicate. companies to buy patents of interest to the syndicate.
It is still too early to tell whether RPX has managed to address these issues It is still too early to tell whether RPX has managed to address these issues successfully: it was founded in 2008, and most of its members are locked in for a successfully: it was founded in 2008, and most of its members are locked in for a minimum of three years, so there is insuffi cient data as yet regarding membership minimum of three years, so there is insuffi cient data as yet regarding membership renewal rates. renewal rates.
Super-aggregator(s)
A new type of player, which we call a super-aggregator, has emerged as the A new type of player, which we call a super-aggregator, has emerged as the largest and most controversial type of intellectual property intermediary. Epitolargest and most controversial type of intellectual property intermediary. Epitomized by Intellectual Ventures, a super-aggregator is a hybrid between a defensive mized by Intellectual Ventures, a super-aggregator is a hybrid between a defensive aggregator, a large nonpracticing entity, and a "weapons dealer," who can provide aggregator, a large nonpracticing entity, and a "weapons dealer," who can provide intellectual property to litigants on both sides of a battle. At the time of this writing, intellectual property to litigants on both sides of a battle. At the time of this writing, Intellectual Ventures seems unique because of its size-the company has raised Intellectual Ventures seems unique because of its size-the company has raised more than $5 billion from a variety of investors-but other entities are trying to more than $5 billion from a variety of investors-but other entities are trying to emulate its model by raising similar amounts of capital. emulate its model by raising similar amounts of capital.
Intellectual Ventures is a nonpracticing entity. Its fi rst investor, Microsoft, Intellectual Ventures is a nonpracticing entity. Its fi rst investor, Microsoft, has publicly said that Intellectual Ventures delivers a highly valued service for has publicly said that Intellectual Ventures delivers a highly valued service for technology fi rms (Hagiu, Yoffi e, and Wagonfeld 2011) . However, critics have technology fi rms (Hagiu, Yoffi e, and Wagonfeld 2011) . However, critics have described Intellectual Ventures as "the world's largest patent troll" because it described Intellectual Ventures as "the world's largest patent troll" because it acquires, creates, and seeks to license patents without directly making any prodacquires, creates, and seeks to license patents without directly making any products or services itself (Orey 2006) . Founded in 2000 by former Microsoft chief ucts or services itself (Orey 2006) . Founded in 2000 by former Microsoft chief technology offi cer Nathan Myrhvold, as of mid-2012 the fi rm has spent approxitechnology offi cer Nathan Myrhvold, as of mid-2012 the fi rm has spent approximately $2 billion building the world's third-largest patent portfolio-roughly mately $2 billion building the world's third-largest patent portfolio-roughly 35,000 patents, mostly covering software, semiconductors, communications, and 35,000 patents, mostly covering software, semiconductors, communications, and e-commerce. Like a venture capital or private equity fi rm, Intellectual Ventures e-commerce. Like a venture capital or private equity fi rm, Intellectual Ventures is structured as a series of funds. Its two largest funds are dedicated to acquiring is structured as a series of funds. Its two largest funds are dedicated to acquiring existing patents from all possible sources: individual inventors, or small and large existing patents from all possible sources: individual inventors, or small and large companies. Its third fund focuses on developing its own inventions in partnership companies. Its third fund focuses on developing its own inventions in partnership with scientists; for example, current projects include a new type of nuclear reactor with scientists; for example, current projects include a new type of nuclear reactor and a laser-based weapon for fi ghting malaria mosquitoes. A fourth fund is targeted and a laser-based weapon for fi ghting malaria mosquitoes. A fourth fund is targeted at developing and acquiring pre-fi ling inventions, mostly from universities in Asia, at developing and acquiring pre-fi ling inventions, mostly from universities in Asia, through a variety of technology transfer deals. through a variety of technology transfer deals.
The last two funds distinguish Intellectual Ventures from typical patent trolls, The last two funds distinguish Intellectual Ventures from typical patent trolls, who do not invent. During its fi rst 10 years, Intellectual Ventures also differed from who do not invent. During its fi rst 10 years, Intellectual Ventures also differed from a typical nonpracticing entity in that it had not litigated-at least not directly. The a typical nonpracticing entity in that it had not litigated-at least not directly. The company had instead sought to monetize its patent portfolios through "friendly" company had instead sought to monetize its patent portfolios through "friendly" licensing deals and, when necessary, by forming shell companies or selling patents to licensing deals and, when necessary, by forming shell companies or selling patents to third-party nonpracticing entities who would in turn litigate. This indirect approach third-party nonpracticing entities who would in turn litigate. This indirect approach changed in December 2010, when Intellectual Ventures started fi ling direct patent changed in December 2010, when Intellectual Ventures started fi ling direct patent infringement lawsuits against a variety of operating companies. In its fi rst lawsuits, infringement lawsuits against a variety of operating companies. In its fi rst lawsuits, Intellectual Ventures fi led three patent infringement suits against nine companies, Intellectual Ventures fi led three patent infringement suits against nine companies, including McAfee, Symantec, and Hynix Semiconductor. In July 2011, Intellectual including McAfee, Symantec, and Hynix Semiconductor. In July 2011, Intellectual Ventures fi led its fourth suit against a group of 12 companies, including HP, Dell, Ventures fi led its fourth suit against a group of 12 companies, including HP, Dell, Wal-Mart, and Best Buy. Wal-Mart, and Best Buy.
The fundamental feature that sets Intellectual Ventures apart from other The fundamental feature that sets Intellectual Ventures apart from other nonpracticing entitities is that many of its investors are strategic and include prominonpracticing entitities is that many of its investors are strategic and include prominent technology companies such as Amazon, American Express, Apple, Cisco, eBay, nent technology companies such as Amazon, American Express, Apple, Cisco, eBay, Google, Intel, Microsoft, Nokia, SAP, Sony, Samsung, and Verizon. Google, Intel, Microsoft, Nokia, SAP, Sony, Samsung, and Verizon. 5 5 For these straFor these strategic investors, Intellectual Ventures also functions as a defensive patent aggregator. tegic investors, Intellectual Ventures also functions as a defensive patent aggregator. Indeed, fi rms that invest in Intellectual Ventures automatically receive licenses for Indeed, fi rms that invest in Intellectual Ventures automatically receive licenses for subsets of the patents acquired by the fi rm (earlier investors receive wider coverage), subsets of the patents acquired by the fi rm (earlier investors receive wider coverage), which serves to shield them against lawsuits from trolls or competitors. which serves to shield them against lawsuits from trolls or competitors.
The dual structure of Intellectual Ventures as both a nonpracticing entity and The dual structure of Intellectual Ventures as both a nonpracticing entity and a defensive aggregator means that it has a potentially diffi cult balance to strike a defensive aggregator means that it has a potentially diffi cult balance to strike between the economic interests of its two types of investors: its strategic investors, between the economic interests of its two types of investors: its strategic investors, who are operating companies, and its fi nancial investors, who include pension who are operating companies, and its fi nancial investors, who include pension funds and university endowments. This confl ict was presumably the reason behind funds and university endowments. This confl ict was presumably the reason behind the fi rm's initial reluctance to litigate directly. The "friendly" licensing approach the fi rm's initial reluctance to litigate directly. The "friendly" licensing approach was aligned with the interests of strategic investors-licensees, while fi nancial inveswas aligned with the interests of strategic investors-licensees, while fi nancial investors' interests are conceivably better served by a more aggressive litigation strategy. tors' interests are conceivably better served by a more aggressive litigation strategy. Suppose, for example, that an operating company is a limited partner in one of Suppose, for example, that an operating company is a limited partner in one of Intellectual Ventures' funds, and is only licensed to part of the portfolio. If the Intellectual Ventures' funds, and is only licensed to part of the portfolio. If the operating company were infringing on new patents bought by Intellectual Ventures, operating company were infringing on new patents bought by Intellectual Ventures, Intellectual Ventures might be reluctant to bring a lawsuit against this company, Intellectual Ventures might be reluctant to bring a lawsuit against this company, thus creating an opportunity cost borne by all of its fi nancial investors. thus creating an opportunity cost borne by all of its fi nancial investors.
The fundamental premise of the Intellectual Ventures model is that its unprecThe fundamental premise of the Intellectual Ventures model is that its unprecedented scale helps reduce search and transaction costs, as well as patent valuation edented scale helps reduce search and transaction costs, as well as patent valuation uncertainty, on both sides of the market. Because of its size, Intellectual Ventures uncertainty, on both sides of the market. Because of its size, Intellectual Ventures can single-handedly create liquidity in the patent market. It has become an attraccan single-handedly create liquidity in the patent market. It has become an attractive outlet for a number of small patent owners, including smaller universities, most tive outlet for a number of small patent owners, including smaller universities, most of whom do not have the necessary legal and technical expertise, resources, and of whom do not have the necessary legal and technical expertise, resources, and credibility to monetize their intellectual property on their own. On the other side of credibility to monetize their intellectual property on their own. On the other side of the market, Intellectual Ventures provides patent buyers and users with a "one-stop the market, Intellectual Ventures provides patent buyers and users with a "one-stop shop" for their licensing needs: similar to RPX, the company is more effi cient when shop" for their licensing needs: similar to RPX, the company is more effi cient when it comes to search and negotiating with multiple patent owners. Furthermore, the it comes to search and negotiating with multiple patent owners. Furthermore, the scale of Intellectual Ventures allows it to capitalize on huge portfolio and learning scale of Intellectual Ventures allows it to capitalize on huge portfolio and learning effects in aggregating patents. effects in aggregating patents.
Of course, the super-aggregator model also carries large risks. Even after Of course, the super-aggregator model also carries large risks. Even after accounting for complementarities and portfolio effects, the inventory risk remains accounting for complementarities and portfolio effects, the inventory risk remains very high: no matter how effectively Intellectual Ventures fi lters the patents that it very high: no matter how effectively Intellectual Ventures fi lters the patents that it buys, many patents turn out to be of low value or poor quality or both (as many as 19 buys, many patents turn out to be of low value or poor quality or both (as many as 19 in 20 or 49 in 50, according to the company's own estimates, as described in Hagiu, in 20 or 49 in 50, according to the company's own estimates, as described in Hagiu, Yoffi e, and Wagonfeld 2011). Furthermore, sorting through and maintaining tens Yoffi e, and Wagonfeld 2011). Furthermore, sorting through and maintaining tens of thousands of patents may actually create diseconomies of scale. After all, patents of thousands of patents may actually create diseconomies of scale. After all, patents are rapidly depreciating assets because their value expires after 20 years, and they are rapidly depreciating assets because their value expires after 20 years, and they require payment of maintenance fees to be kept valid (several hundred to a few require payment of maintenance fees to be kept valid (several hundred to a few thousand dollars to be paid at the end of years 3, 7, and 11 (as explained at the thousand dollars to be paid at the end of years 3, 7, and 11 (as explained at the USPTO website, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/process/maintain.jsp). USPTO website, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/process/maintain.jsp).
Finally, the time-horizon for Intellectual Ventures investment funds is relatively Finally, the time-horizon for Intellectual Ventures investment funds is relatively long at 15-20 years, and one may question whether the fi rm will ever be able to long at 15-20 years, and one may question whether the fi rm will ever be able to generate returns for its investors comparable to other investment vehicles with generate returns for its investors comparable to other investment vehicles with similar time horizons, like venture capital and private equity. The last concern similar time horizons, like venture capital and private equity. The last concern suggests that Intellectual Ventures is under pressure to engage in more lawsuits. Yet suggests that Intellectual Ventures is under pressure to engage in more lawsuits. Yet the lawsuits raise their own problems: cost escalation and, even more seriously, the the lawsuits raise their own problems: cost escalation and, even more seriously, the risk of having some patents invalidated by the courts, which might cast doubts on risk of having some patents invalidated by the courts, which might cast doubts on the value of Intellectual Ventures' broader patent portfolio. the value of Intellectual Ventures' broader patent portfolio.
Implications and Conclusions
The patent system is inherently a second-best mechanism for trading off the The patent system is inherently a second-best mechanism for trading off the benefi ts of enhanced future innovation against the costs of temporary distortions benefi ts of enhanced future innovation against the costs of temporary distortions of the economic system after innovation has occurred. Furthermore, the practical of the economic system after innovation has occurred. Furthermore, the practical realities of the patent system have created additional problems: for instance, a realities of the patent system have created additional problems: for instance, a substantial number of low-quality, overlapping, and excessively broad patents. substantial number of low-quality, overlapping, and excessively broad patents. Patent intermediaries (including the new ones described in this article) are able Patent intermediaries (including the new ones described in this article) are able to profi t from the patent system's inherent tension by improving the payoffs to to profi t from the patent system's inherent tension by improving the payoffs to innovators and/or by taxing more heavily the fruits of past innovations. Given the innovators and/or by taxing more heavily the fruits of past innovations. Given the organizational complexity of the new patent intermediaries and the multiplicity of organizational complexity of the new patent intermediaries and the multiplicity of channels through which they affect participants in the patent market, it is very diffichannels through which they affect participants in the patent market, it is very difficult to draw clear conclusions about whether they generate net benefi ts or costs for cult to draw clear conclusions about whether they generate net benefi ts or costs for society. Nevertheless, it is useful to point out that intermediation mechanisms that society. Nevertheless, it is useful to point out that intermediation mechanisms that move the imperfect patent system in the direction of enhancing rewards for innovamove the imperfect patent system in the direction of enhancing rewards for innovation are more likely to be a positive, while mechanisms that move the system in the tion are more likely to be a positive, while mechanisms that move the system in the direction of extracting taxes on prior innovation are likely to be a social negative. direction of extracting taxes on prior innovation are likely to be a social negative. The new patent intermediaries clearly do both-and in fact, cannot do one without The new patent intermediaries clearly do both-and in fact, cannot do one without the other. But their organizational structures and business models may be skewed the other. But their organizational structures and business models may be skewed more heavily on one side or the other, which provides some basis for considering more heavily on one side or the other, which provides some basis for considering their net social value. their net social value.
While defensive aggregators are completely aligned with the interests of operWhile defensive aggregators are completely aligned with the interests of operating companies in reducing the patent troll threat, this orientation does not mean ating companies in reducing the patent troll threat, this orientation does not mean that they improve the overall effi ciency of the patent market. To some extent, they that they improve the overall effi ciency of the patent market. To some extent, they facilitate collusion between large operating companies at the expense of small facilitate collusion between large operating companies at the expense of small inventors. By defi nition, their incentives are to acquire relevant intellectual propinventors. By defi nition, their incentives are to acquire relevant intellectual property at the lowest possible cost to defend their subscribers, not to maximize the value erty at the lowest possible cost to defend their subscribers, not to maximize the value of the patents they acquire. Thus, they are likely to exacerbate the bargaining and of the patents they acquire. Thus, they are likely to exacerbate the bargaining and information asymmetries between small patent owners and large operating compainformation asymmetries between small patent owners and large operating companies (a similar effect to that of traditional cross-licensing practices). nies (a similar effect to that of traditional cross-licensing practices).
Intellectual Ventures (and other future super-aggregators) are signifi cantly Intellectual Ventures (and other future super-aggregators) are signifi cantly more complicated because of their hybrid nature. Let us consider how a supermore complicated because of their hybrid nature. Let us consider how a superaggregator affects the incentives of operating companies, fi nancial investors, and aggregator affects the incentives of operating companies, fi nancial investors, and small inventors. Operating companies may see their operating costs increase when small inventors. Operating companies may see their operating costs increase when Intellectual Ventures aggregates and asserts previously "silent" patents against them. Intellectual Ventures aggregates and asserts previously "silent" patents against them. But a super-aggregator like Intellectual Ventures may also lower their aggregate But a super-aggregator like Intellectual Ventures may also lower their aggregate search and transaction costs by providing a one-stop group-licensing shop-just like search and transaction costs by providing a one-stop group-licensing shop-just like defensive aggregators do for their members. This service is particularly valuable for defensive aggregators do for their members. This service is particularly valuable for technology companies in sectors with short innovation cycles. As a consequence, the technology companies in sectors with short innovation cycles. As a consequence, the net effect of Intellectual Ventures on the development and innovation incentives net effect of Intellectual Ventures on the development and innovation incentives on operating companies is ambiguous. Some operating companies like Microsoft on operating companies is ambiguous. Some operating companies like Microsoft view it as providing a useful patent discovery and licensing service; others view it view it as providing a useful patent discovery and licensing service; others view it as a dangerous nonpracticing entity which signifi cantly raises their costs. Small as a dangerous nonpracticing entity which signifi cantly raises their costs. Small patent owners, individual inventors, and small companies and universities involved patent owners, individual inventors, and small companies and universities involved in invention unambiguously benefi t from the existence of Intellectual Ventures, in invention unambiguously benefi t from the existence of Intellectual Ventures, because it channels more fi nancial rewards to previously undercompensated invenbecause it channels more fi nancial rewards to previously undercompensated inventors, which should unambiguously increase their innovation incentives. Similarly, tors, which should unambiguously increase their innovation incentives. Similarly, fi nancial (nonstrategic) investors see Intellectual Ventures as a viable vehicle for fi nancial (nonstrategic) investors see Intellectual Ventures as a viable vehicle for investing in patents as a new, large, and uncorrelated asset class. investing in patents as a new, large, and uncorrelated asset class.
Due to huge economies of scale, it seems most likely that in the long run Due to huge economies of scale, it seems most likely that in the long run there will only be a few super-aggregators -or even just one. This concentration there will only be a few super-aggregators -or even just one. This concentration raises signifi cant hold-up concerns. A super-aggregator may become nothing more raises signifi cant hold-up concerns. A super-aggregator may become nothing more than a super-troll, able to hold up both sides of the market by extracting excessive than a super-troll, able to hold up both sides of the market by extracting excessive payments from operating companies (for example, by strategically disaggregating payments from operating companies (for example, by strategically disaggregating patent portfolios and enforcing the different parts sequentially) while at the same patent portfolios and enforcing the different parts sequentially) while at the same time paying lower compensation to inventors. Perhaps an even greater source of time paying lower compensation to inventors. Perhaps an even greater source of concern is that super-aggregators' incentives may be skewed towards imposing concern is that super-aggregators' incentives may be skewed towards imposing higher fees on operating companies higher fees on operating companies current production activities, rather than faciliactivities, rather than facilitating the commercialization of tating the commercialization of unproven patents (a riskier endeavor).
(a riskier endeavor). But, perhaps surprisingly, there could also be signifi cant social effi ciency gains But, perhaps surprisingly, there could also be signifi cant social effi ciency gains from super-aggregator market concentration. Scale leads to signifi cant learning from super-aggregator market concentration. Scale leads to signifi cant learning effects in assessing the value of patents, which may create a more reliable mechaeffects in assessing the value of patents, which may create a more reliable mechanism for patent valuation (where patent platforms have failed). Furthermore, in nism for patent valuation (where patent platforms have failed). Furthermore, in the second-best world created by patent market failures, which lead to excessive the second-best world created by patent market failures, which lead to excessive patent infringement, it may be effi cient to have only a few (or one) market-based patent infringement, it may be effi cient to have only a few (or one) market-based enforcer(s). A super-aggregator, in theory, can compensate inventors of a given enforcer(s). A super-aggregator, in theory, can compensate inventors of a given patent (or portfolio) who otherwise would fall through the cracks. When a superpatent (or portfolio) who otherwise would fall through the cracks. When a superaggregator buys patents in order to assert them against operating companies that aggregator buys patents in order to assert them against operating companies that attempt to free-ride on the intellectual property, it preserves the incentives for future attempt to free-ride on the intellectual property, it preserves the incentives for future innovation. Finally, scale and capital structure, and the accompanying large returns innovation. Finally, scale and capital structure, and the accompanying large returns promised to fi nancial investors, can act as credible commitments to build valuable promised to fi nancial investors, can act as credible commitments to build valuable patent portfolios and license them broadly to many players in any given industry. patent portfolios and license them broadly to many players in any given industry. In particular, a super-aggregator's ability to sign large numbers of licensees, without In particular, a super-aggregator's ability to sign large numbers of licensees, without the risks of litigation, depends on its reputation. Enforcing even one weak patent the risks of litigation, depends on its reputation. Enforcing even one weak patent for "nuisance value" (like many small nonpracticing entities do) would run the risk for "nuisance value" (like many small nonpracticing entities do) would run the risk of casting doubt over the value of the super-aggregator's broader patent portfolio. of casting doubt over the value of the super-aggregator's broader patent portfolio. This is an instance of the reputation-building mechanism by intermediaries in This is an instance of the reputation-building mechanism by intermediaries in contexts with goods of uncertain quality, as studied formally by Biglaiser (1993) . contexts with goods of uncertain quality, as studied formally by Biglaiser (1993) .
The task of empirically measuring the The task of empirically measuring the net economic impact of any intellectual economic impact of any intellectual property intermediary and deciding whether it is harmful to society is inherently property intermediary and deciding whether it is harmful to society is inherently diffi cult. Such an analysis would require measuring the net effect on operating diffi cult. Such an analysis would require measuring the net effect on operating companies, inventors, universities, and fi nancial investors, both in terms of shortcompanies, inventors, universities, and fi nancial investors, both in terms of shortrun payments made or received and in terms of long-run innovation incentives. run payments made or received and in terms of long-run innovation incentives. These effects seem dauntingly complex to measure. For this reason, most recent These effects seem dauntingly complex to measure. For this reason, most recent empirical studies only estimate the effects on one side of the market-and thus are empirical studies only estimate the effects on one side of the market-and thus are by defi nition incomplete. Examples include the Bessen, Meurer, and Ford (2011) by defi nition incomplete. Examples include the Bessen, Meurer, and Ford (2011) estimates of the costs imposed by trolls on operating companies between 1990 and estimates of the costs imposed by trolls on operating companies between 1990 , and Tucker (2012 evaluating the effect of trolls on the adoption of medical 2010, and Tucker (2012) evaluating the effect of trolls on the adoption of medical imaging technology sold by vendors targeted by trolls. imaging technology sold by vendors targeted by trolls.
Part of the problem is the diffi culty of measuring net transfers to inventors. In Part of the problem is the diffi culty of measuring net transfers to inventors. In many cases, nonpracticing entities make lump-sum payments to inventors in exchange many cases, nonpracticing entities make lump-sum payments to inventors in exchange for control of their patents for control of their patents before any litigation occurs; for example, Intellectual any litigation occurs; for example, Intellectual Ventures spent over $1 billion dollars acquiring patents from various sources before Ventures spent over $1 billion dollars acquiring patents from various sources before it began suing publicly in late 2010. These transfers are usually not disclosed publicly, it began suing publicly in late 2010. These transfers are usually not disclosed publicly, unlike the settlements or damages resulting from lawsuits. In the absence of access to unlike the settlements or damages resulting from lawsuits. In the absence of access to such information, empirical research on intellectual property intermediaries might such information, empirical research on intellectual property intermediaries might tackle some narrower effi ciency questions. For example, an important contributing tackle some narrower effi ciency questions. For example, an important contributing factor to the effect of nonpracticing entities (including super-aggregators) on innovafactor to the effect of nonpracticing entities (including super-aggregators) on innovation incentives is whether they seek to enforce tion incentives is whether they seek to enforce proven patents on patents on existing products products or to facilitate the commercialization of or to facilitate the commercialization of unproven patents. Thus, perhaps one could patents. Thus, perhaps one could categorize and measure the mix of patents monetized by nonpracticing entities categorize and measure the mix of patents monetized by nonpracticing entities (even without transaction prices) to provide a valuable proxy for their likely effect (even without transaction prices) to provide a valuable proxy for their likely effect on innovation. on innovation. 
